

Political Parties in South Asia

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CHAPTER 7

Pakistan People's Party: The Twin Legacies of Socialism and Dynastic Rule

Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah

ORIGIN, EVOLUTION, AND GROWTH OF THE PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (1967–1969)

The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) was founded in Lahore on 30 November–1 December 1967. The two-day Convention, attended by politically minded people from West Pakistan, was intended to cover important matters like the formation of the party, giving the new party a proper name, flag, electing its chairman and also providing a constitution or Foundation Documents for the party. It is essential to briefly give a background of the circumstances leading to the formation of the party and its effects on the then prevailing political scene of Pakistan.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (5 January 1928–4 April 1979), the founder of the PPP, belonged to a leading elite family of the Sindh region. With an educational background from Berkeley, Oxford and London, he returned to Pakistan in November 1953, "thoroughly westernized."¹ He took up law and started practice as an assistant to Ram Chandani Dingomal, a prominent Hindu lawyer. Family connections served well and soon he developed his taste for active politics. Speaking fluent Sindhi and English, he easily mixed with old family friends and politicians including Iskander Mirza, then President of Pakistan. Mirza met Zulfikar in Larkana, Bhutto's home town, during one of his partridge shooting parties, organized by his father Shah Nawaz Bhutto, and developed a personal relationship with him. In 1957 Mirza sent Bhutto to New York as a member of the Pakistan delegation to the 12th

United Nations General Assembly. Next, Bhutto was assigned the chairmanship of the Pakistan delegation to the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Seas in April 1958.²

On 7 October 1958 the Constitution was abrogated and Martial Law was declared in Pakistan. Iskander Mirza remained the President and Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief was appointed as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Bhutto was inducted in the new cabinet as the Minister of Commerce and Industries. In spite being the youngest minister (he was only 30 at that time) Bhutto, with his "youthful exuberance, oratorical gift, dynamism, and national orientation" won Ayub's confidence and soon was elevated to other important positions.³ In January 1960 Bhutto was allotted the Ministry of Information and National Reconstruction. One of the main responsibilities of his new job was the projection of the regime's policies, including its Basic Democracies scheme. It brought him much closer to Ayub. His next assignment was the additional charge of the Ministry of Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, and also Kashmir Affairs. He gradually moved "closer to Ayub Khan and by the end of the year had slipped unnoticed into the inner coterie."⁴ Thus Bhutto started his political career on very cordial terms with Ayub who liked his smart Sindhi adviser. An important factor that helped Bhutto in his initial rise to power, according to Stanley Wolpert, Bhutto's biographer, was his lack of "prior political involvement." He had "entered the military government by appointment, of course, so he did not have to worry about election campaigns or pleasing constituents."⁵

Around 1960, several regional and international factors contributed to a change in Pakistan's foreign policy. In January 1963 Bhutto was elevated as Pakistan's Foreign Minister for which he had been "waiting, working, itching for almost all his life."⁶ Bhutto himself was not the architect but after taking over as Foreign Minister, the China policy gained a new impetus. Various trade and border agreements were signed with China, the most important being the Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement on 2 March 1963. Annoyed at the new rapprochement between China and Pakistan, the United States of America threatened Pakistan with some dire consequences including cutting of financial assistance under various aid packages. Bhutto immediately turned to China, which responded positively by declaring that it would give whatever possible within their capacity to aid Pakistan.⁷ Bhutto's keen interest in bringing Pakistan closer to the Afro-Asian Community went hand in hand with his anti-Americanism, socialist rhetoric and populist style.

Bhutto's organizational capabilities won him another important position: he was appointed as the General Secretary of Ayub Khan's Convention Muslim League. In his capacity as the general secretary of the President's party, he came closer to the political circles of the country. It was here that Bhutto learnt much about the shifting of political loyalties

and intrigues. His main task was to defend the Government's policies and to explain the Constitution of 1962 to various political forums. He came closer to Ayub Khan.⁸ Bhutto remained a staunch supporter of the regime till March 1966. Differences were noticed after the Tashkent Declaration signed in January 1966 between Ayub Khan and the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. Under the Declaration, Pakistan and India agreed on a Soviet draft agreement of a ceasefire including a non-war declaration. However, this declaration said nothing about the Kashmir dispute other than that the two sides had discussed it and had set forth their respective positions. It provided for an exchange of the prisoners of war and the return of both Pakistani and Indian forces to positions they held before 5 August 1965.⁹ The Tashkent Declaration seemed unpopular with a section of Pakistanis, particularly the people of Punjab, who disapproved of it. There were protest meetings in various parts of the province and police firings in Lahore, resulting in a number of deaths. Bhutto, in his official capacity as Foreign Minister of the regime, defended the declaration, both inside as well as outside the parliament. But it was rumored that he disapproved of it and would soon leave Ayub's administration. Interestingly, Altaf Gauhar, then Information Secretary, who was also present at Tashkent, informed that Bhutto was fully involved in the negotiations at Tashkent. He had been also involved in the drafting and adoption of the Declaration.¹⁰ In March, Bhutto was ordered to resign as Secretary General of the Convention Muslim League, followed by his eventual "parting of ways" with Ayub Khan in June 1966. Bhutto was asked to take "sick leave" abroad, facilitated by the government, provided he would make no political speeches during his long leave for health reasons, to which he agreed. Moreover, as Ayub still retained firm control over the army, and "without the army, Zulfi knew," as his biographer put it, "no redeemer, no matter how popular or how great his mystic powers might be, stood a chance of storming Pakistan's many barricades to the twin citadels in Rawalpindi and Islamabad."¹¹ He, thus, avoided direct confrontation with the government.

FORMATION OF THE PARTY AND THE EARLY PROGRAM

In August 1966 Bhutto departed for Europe. While abroad, as per "agreement" with Ayub's administration, he restrained himself from any direct attacks on Ayub Khan and his policies. He spent a couple of months in Europe and returned to Pakistan at the beginning of October quite unclear as to what course to take. He was considering various options open to him and was unsure about his political future. According to popular perception, there were then three possibilities for Bhutto: to form a "forward bloc" within the Convention ML, to join one of the opposition parties or to form his own new political party with a clear stand on national and

international issues, *id est* independence on foreign loans, prevention of private enterprise thriving at the cost of the people and the creation of a welfare society in Pakistan.

By February 1967 an organized campaign to malign the personality of Bhutto was initiated by Ayub's regime. Direct pressure on Bhutto was increased. The government was trying to dissuade him from using the sensitive issue of Indo-Pak relations, particularly the cease-fire and the Tashkent Declaration. Bhutto was personally harassed and his public meetings were often disrupted. Bhutto eventually decided to form a new party and indicated that it would be a radical, reformist, democratic, socialist and egalitarian party. Like-minded people were invited to Lahore to discuss and devise ways and means for the new political organization. A Convention was held at Mubashir Hasan's residence at Lahore on 30 November–1 December 1967. The new party was named Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). The party flag was also decided: it had a white crescent and a star on the forefront with three vertical stripes; red, black and green. A set of ten Foundation Documents¹² had been provided and were read out loud at the occasion. These documents provided in broad terms the ideology and party program of the PPP. The party's motto was summed up as: "Islam is our faith; Democracy is our polity; Socialism is our economy; All power to the people." The manifesto adopted at Lahore gave the ultimate objective of the party as attainment of a classless society, which was deemed as possible only through socialism, calling for "true equality of the citizen's fraternity under the rule of democracy" within an "order based on economic and social justice." In other words, according to Document 4, socialism alone could cure Pakistan's economic and political crisis. Further elaborating on the rights of industrial workers, the PPP promised them welfare and a better future.¹³

Apart from the nationalization of finance and key sectors of industry, the PPP also called for some other fundamental changes including the strengthening of trade unions. It also sought the abolition of illiteracy, equal rights for women, the separation of executive from judiciary and educational reforms in the country. It also advocated a non-aligned foreign policy including withdrawal from all defense pacts, solidarity with Afro-Asian and Latin American countries and disassociation from the Tashkent Declaration and finally an honorable settlement with India on Kashmir and other disputes.

In January 1968 Bhutto started his mass contact program from the Punjab. He began his direct contact with the people.¹⁴ "Land to the landless" was an irresistible call to the peasants. The party promised not only to abolish feudalism in the country but also to distribute land amongst the landless and poor peasants. They flocked into the PPP, considering it a party working for the demolition of capitalism. Students who often bore the brunt of the Ayub regime during the whole decade of his rule were

promised a better future and more opportunities to improve their educational career. The new party also promised to provide jobs to those rural migrants who were shifting to urban centers and were faced with a lack of job opportunities, poor housing and rising prices. Many intellectuals had felt stifled by press control and other authoritarian methods adopted by the Ayub regime and joined the PPP in order to get rid of the then administration. Various civil and military officers, disgruntled at Ayub's good relations with India, joined Bhutto as his anti-India speeches and his stand on Kashmir had satisfied them at least for the time being.

The religious and sectarian minorities including Hindus, Christians, Ahmadis, and Shias flocked into the PPP. They were unhappy over the treatment meted out to them by the Sunni majority. However, in Sindh Bhutto's supporters included some big landlords whose grievances against the "Karachi-Punjab axis of power" were exploited and utilized.¹⁵ Eventually, slogans like *Roti, Kaapra aur Makaan* (bread, clothes and housing) became a rallying call for the party.¹⁶

THE ELECTIONS OF 1970 AND THE DISMEMBERMENT OF PAKISTAN

By 1970, the Awami League (AL), representing the interests of East Pakistan, had adopted Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Six Points as its political creed. Ayub's administration had termed Mujib and the AL as "secessionists" and decided to crush the party's growing power and popularity by force. The general crackdown on the AL, however, sparked off protest rallies and demonstrations in the whole of East Pakistan. The government used force but failed to crush the movement. It was regarded as another hostile act of Ayub's administration, predominantly West Pakistani elite, against the Bengalis.

Bhutto's anti-India stand, on the other hand, was appreciated by the army command. Compared to Mujib with his "secessionist army of Bengalis," Bhutto with his close links with the Generals was more acceptable to the army elite of Sandhurst graduates, particularly to General Yahya Khan, the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army.¹⁷

By late 1968, demonstrations and protest meetings were almost a routine, organized by the opposition including mainly the National Awami Party (NAP), Awami League, PPP and even the religious parties of the country that endorsed and supported the movement against Ayub. The government initially responded by using force but later succumbed to the public pressure giving heed to various rounds of talks with the opposition.¹⁸ But the negotiations remained fruitless and eventually Ayub Khan stepped down and on 25 March 1969 transferred power to his Commander-in-Chief, General Mohammad Yahya Khan. After assuming power, Yahya Khan announced his resolve to transfer power to the public representatives as

soon as possible and promised an impartial general election on the basis of adult franchise.

The PPP had not yet developed any strong publication cell, *Al Fatah*, *Nusrat*, and *Mussawat* being the only newspapers with a limited circulation. The PPP leaders addressed the gatherings by adopting the oral tradition of approaching the masses directly. Corner meetings and public rallies were arranged, organized and addressed by the PPP leaders. The party manifesto, prepared by J. A. Rahim, with a red cover symbolizing revolution, commenced and ended with the words from the party's motto "All Power to the People." Giving details of how the common masses were betrayed by the elite in the past and describing the various injustices meted out to East Pakistan, it pleaded for a classless society, possible only "through socialism in our time."¹⁹ During the election campaign, Bhutto was criticized by some religious parties of preaching "socialism" which they termed as "Kufr" (anti-Islamic). Bhutto changed the word "Islamic Socialism" for *Musawwat-I-Muhammadi* (equality as preached by Prophet Mohammad).

As scheduled, the first ever free and fair general elections in Pakistan, based on adult franchise and one-man-one-vote were held on 7 December 1970. About 57 million voters went to the polls. The election results gave the Awami League a strong mandate and by winning 151 out of 153 seats it emerged as the single majority party in East Pakistan. The PPP won 62 of the 82 seats in the Punjab; 18 out of the 27 seats in Sindh; one seat in the North-Western Frontier Province with none in Balochistan nor in East Pakistan, thus getting 81 seats in total. The Awami League emerged as the voice of East Pakistan; PPP succeeded in getting the full-fledged support of the Punjab and Sindh while in Balochistan and in the NWFP (North Western Frontier Province), NAP (Wali Group) represented the general will of the people. Thus East Pakistan, the Punjab, and Balochistan became the exclusive preserves of the Awami League, the PPP and NAP, while in Sindh and in the NWFP both PPP and NAP emerged as majority parties.

The outcome of the elections was shocking to many in the echelon of power. The AL's getting an absolute majority was particularly disliked by the army which was in no way keen to hand over power to Mujib and his colleagues with their insistence on the Six Points program. One consoling factor for Bhutto was, however, the PPP's strong support in the Punjab and Sindh, the real power base in Pakistan.²⁰

In the following months, political leaders in East and West Pakistan proved unable to constructively solve the emerging antagonism. The attempted crackdown on East Pakistan's aspirations led to the intervention of India in the conflict and resulted in a short but intensive war. Bhutto was in New York, representing Pakistan at the Security Council, when on 16 December he heard the tragic news of the surrender of 93,000

Pakistani troops under the command of General A. K. Niazi. The next day he flew to Florida to meet Nixon, the American President, who assured him of the ample U.S. military and monetary support. On 18 December he started his journey back home via Teheran, where he met the Shah of Iran, and reached Pakistan on 20 December. The same day Bhutto was sworn in as the President of Pakistan and the civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator (for the first time the position had been occupied by a civilian) and was handed over power by Yahya Khan.

REFORMS UNDER BHUTTO (1971-1977)

Bhutto's period in power lasted for about five and a half years, during which the country's economy was restructured; the public sector given ample importance; Pakistan's foreign policy changed, particularly its relations with India were reconstituted; and, a new consensus was developed inside the country on constitutional issues enabling the country to get an agreed Constitution (1973) for Pakistan.

When Bhutto took over power in December 1971, Pakistan was confronted with the worst kind of economic situation. Bhutto made it clear from the very beginning of his assumption of power that "... fundamentally it is the economic system, the social and economic system that requires changes and adjustment."²¹ In January 1972, he started with the nationalization of 10 basic industries including iron and steel, basic metals, heavy engineering, heavy electrical, motor vehicles, tractor plants, heavy and basic chemicals, cement, petro-chemicals, gas, and oil refineries. Three basic features of the policy were decentralization of wealth, reorganization of industrial units and consolidation of the public sector. Moreover, with the introduction of the labor policy (February 1972) Bhutto's regime tried to provide some hitherto neglected basic facilities to the working class. The labor exchange program was evolved with the Middle Eastern countries and the public sector was expanded.

Nationalization of banks was another step as were the agrarian reforms; the latter were to be implemented in three stages (1972, 1975, and 1976). Through these reforms individual ceilings on landholding were reduced from 1,000 acres of non-irrigated land to 300 acres and from 500 acres to 150 acres of irrigated land. The main idea behind the land reforms was to rationalize the landholding in order to increase agricultural productivity. Keeping in view the presence of a large number of landlords in the PPP, these reforms were not seriously implemented. Instead of providing a boost to the agricultural production, these reforms rather aggravated the already tense situation between landlords and peasants.

These measures provided some benefits to the working class and the small-scale businessman and facilitated some economic growth in the country.²² However, at some points they proved to be counter-productive.

For example, while provisions for medical and other facilities, low-cost housing and free education for children were announced, no government department was held accountable for its non-implementation. The same "outdated and oppressive" labor laws, operative since the 1930s, giving absolute powers to the bosses, remained into effect even resulting in the escalation of labor unrest. The majority of the working class in the private sector remained "unhappy and prone to strike." As a consequence, the regime gave enormous power to the newly formed Federal Security Force (FSC), notorious for its ruthless suppression of strikes and likewise activities in the country. Thus Bhutto, who before assuming power was advocating the workers' cause, became cynical about their interests. He crushed the organizational strength of the labor movement by force, eventually losing the support of the working class. Actually, Bhutto wanted that all effective levers of political powers should remain under his tight control.

Following initial action of the various oppositional forces in the drafting of the new Constitution for Pakistan, Bhutto's ruthless treatment of the opposition, outside as well as inside Parliament, in the subsequent years clearly showed his autocratic attitude. His various amendments to the Constitution demonstrated his intolerance of any opposition to his rule. A decisive step towards his ultimate goal was turning Pakistan into a one-party state.²³ On 7 January 1977 Bhutto announced that free and fair general elections under the Constitution would be held in March. The Election Commission fixed 7 and 10 March as the polling dates, respectively, for elections to the National Assembly (NA) and the four Provincial Assemblies. Within a couple of days, the fragmented opposition parties gathered and on 11 January announced the formation of an election alliance, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA).²⁴ The opposition was able to attract large gatherings to its public meetings. It seemed that they would capture a significant number of seats in both the NA and Provincial Assemblies. However, to the utter surprise of the political analysts and opposition, the PPP had, beyond all expectations, "a landslide victory" by capturing 155 seats out of contested 192 general seats. The PNA alleged that the elections had been rigged on a massive scale, rejected the results, boycotted the election for Provincial Assemblies, and launched a movement against the PPP regime calling for the resignation of Bhutto and new elections under impartial authorities. On 12 March, the PNA launched its mass movement to dislodge Bhutto from power. Demonstrations started throughout Pakistan, fired upon first by the police and then by the armed forces resulting in the deaths of hundreds of people in the country.²⁵ Martial Law was declared in important urban centers including Lahore, Karachi and Hyderabad. Opposition parties were contacted, summoned and several rounds of talks held between the PNA and government. The PNA took the position that it would talk with Bhutto only if he accepted their demands

including his resignation from office. The government rejected opposition demands time and again. As both sides remained adamant to their respective positions, these negotiations failed giving an opportunity to the army to intervene. On 5 July 1977 Martial Law was proclaimed, Bhutto's government dismissed and he was imprisoned.²⁶

The following Martial Law regime under General Zia-ul-Haq published a White Paper (in four volumes) accusing Bhutto of abusing the state power, of nepotism, malpractice and of using the state agencies against his opponents and critics of the regime and the ruling party.²⁷ Bhutto tried to exonerate himself from these allegations and regarded the White Paper as "White Lies," aimed at tarnishing Bhutto's image in public and to "seek to generate hatred and resentment against him, to demolish his image."²⁸ Bhutto was tried for the murder of Ahmad Raza Qasuri's father, Nawab Mohammad Ahmad Khan. Raza Qasuri was elected on the PPP ticket but later on became an "outspoken" MPA. The trial lasted from September 1977 till March 1979. The Lahore High Court found Bhutto guilty and gave him the death sentence. An appeal was filed in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which was turned down, and he was executed on 4 April 1979.²⁹

Before we consider the developments within the PPP after the death of its founder Bhutto, it is pertinent to write a few words about the organizational aspects of the party. Very little attention has been paid by contemporary scholars to the organizational character of the PPP, which basically remained weak. Internal dissension, factionalism and feuds within the party remained a permanent feature of the early PPP. Initially fear of other pressure groups and political parties, common purpose and "streaks of idealism" held various sections in the party together. After its coming to power, the PPP became prone to factionalism, particularly in the Punjab where the struggle for leadership resulted in the re-organization at the top level of the party. The dominance of Bhutto was regarded as the principal reason for the factionalism within the party.³⁰ The People's Party, according to Gul Hasan, another close associate of Bhutto, "began with Bhutto and ended with Bhutto, for he was its undisputed leader and he knew it and so did the other members of his party. Both within his party and outside it, he was allergic to sharing power with anyone because he saw himself as the only one capable of governing the country. The 'spirit of adjustment' just did not figure in his nature."³¹

Moreover, there remained in the PPP a diverse group of people whose ideological differences exacerbated the tensions within the party. J. A. Rahim and Mairaj Mohammad Khan always advocated a left revolution while landed aristocracy, represented by Mustafa Khar and other leading landlords from the Punjab and Sindh, opposed it. Bhutto neglected the party organization. No general party conference was called throughout the period under Bhutto except the one in March 1972.³² Thus it can be said that although successful in winning power, the PPP never

developed organizationally. Distrustful of his own party men, and particularly of the leftists in the organization, Bhutto himself systematically weakened the party and purged it of its cadre of activists and ideologists. To retain a firm grip, he did not permit internal party elections for PPP offices throughout the 1970s and that policy has continued, turning PPP into an extension of the Bhutto family.

THE PPP'S SECOND PHASE: THE RISE AND FALL OF BENAZIR BHUTTO

Zia-ul-Haq's coup on 5 July 1977 surprised Bhutto and many other political observers in Pakistan. Zia (12 August 1924–17 August 1988) was a professional military officer, who earlier had showed no interest in politics. His simple and docile way of living, his reputation of being a devout Muslim and his loyalty to the state and to the armed forces of Pakistan earned him a good name.³³

During his eleven years long rule Zia-ul-Haq did his utmost to keep the PPP under tight government control. He reshaped Pakistani politics by political manipulation and used Islam as a lever to prolong his own rule. The crisis in neighboring Afghanistan proved a "blessing in disguise" for Zia-ul-Haq. By supporting the Afghan resistance he earned for himself a good place with the religious and right wing conservative parties inside the country. To counter the Soviet activities in Afghanistan and to provide a boost to Afghan resistance, he was given a free hand by the USA, the West and other anti-Soviet powers outside Pakistan to prolong his rule. Zia-ul-Haq opposed the restoration of democratic institutions in Pakistan and instead relied upon his own handpicked members in the *Majlis-i-Shura* (Federal Council). Time and again the regime promised fair and impartial elections to bring democracy back to the country—but failed to fulfill this promise. Elections were postponed over and over again. Instead, he concentrated on the establishment of a "true Islamic system" in Pakistan. He introduced various Islamic provisions in the Constitution of Pakistan. Shariat Courts were established and steps were taken to implement *Sharia* in Pakistan.

In August 1979 the Political Parties Act was amended by a Presidential Ordinance requiring the then existing political parties to register with the Election Commission, to provide details of their funding and expenditure and to publish their formal manifestos. The government promised to allow political activities but only to those parties that had previously been registered with the Election Commission of Pakistan. The PPP was debarred from taking part in active politics of the country since the party had failed to register itself with the Election Commission.

The opposition parties, including the PPP led by Benazir Bhutto (the Western-educated daughter of Z.A. Bhutto, who became obsessed with

avenging her father's death, restoring the PPP to power and restoring the 1973 Constitution), gathered and in February 1981 formed an organization called Movement for the Restoration for Democracy (MRD).³⁴ The first joint statement of the MRD issued in February 1981 demanded the withdrawal of Martial Law, free and fair impartial elections under the 1973 Constitution and the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. Initially the MRD appealed to the legacy of Bhutto and his populist program, but "over time it found a base of support among those who favored an end to military rule and the return of democracy."³⁵ In August 1983, the MRD launched its civil disobedience movement against the government with little response from the Punjab, the NWFP and Balochistan while in Sindh it sparked a militant movement that eventually provoked a crackdown on PPP workers. It produced intense violence and manifested strong ethnic and regional sentiments.

Zia was hoping to prevent the PPP from coming back to power. He was sure that if given a chance for elections on the basis of political parties, the PPP would win a large number of seats in the parliament and would avenge the execution of Z.A. Bhutto. As the Bhutto family had not forgiven the generals for the removal of the PPP government under Bhutto and his execution, a PPP victory in polls was regarded as suicidal for the army. Zia-ul-Haq, after equipping himself with all powers under the presidency, announced for lifting of martial law in December 1985.

On 17 August 1988 Zia-ul-Haq died in an air crash near Bahawalpur along with several of his senior military associates. On the same afternoon Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the Chairman of the Senate, was sworn in as the President of Pakistan. To the great relief of Benazir Bhutto and her party, he announced that the general elections scheduled for 17 November 1988 would be held in time.³⁶ Benazir Bhutto, now the co-chairperson of the PPP, attracted large public gatherings during the electioneering. The parties opposed to the PPP formed another electoral alliance, the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), to counter the secular program of the PPP. The election manifesto of the PPP revolved around one issue: Pakistan's return to democracy and repudiation of Zia's eleven years' rule. To the utter surprise of the PPP high command, the PPP did less well electorally than was expected. It got 92 seats in total but succeeded in sweeping the polls in rural Sindh. Even Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, a close associate of Z. A. Bhutto, who had left the party when Benazir Bhutto refused to give him a senior position in the party, was defeated. Jatoi had formed his own splinter group, the National People's Party. In urban Sindh, particularly Karachi and Hyderabad, another recently established ethnic party, the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) swept the polls. The IJI under Mian Nawaz Sharif, the former chief minister of the Punjab, who remained very close to the military dictator, succeeded in getting 54 seats, thereby forming the second largest group in the NA. In the provincial legislatures, IJI kept its

hold in the Punjab assembly; in Sindh, the urban voters chose MQM members as its spokesmen while in the rural Sindh, the PPP emerged as the majority party; in the NWFP the seats were divided between the ANP and the PPP; while the Balochistan National Alliance (BNA) represented the Baloch aspirations.

Eventually, Benazir Bhutto was invited to become the Prime Minister but she had "to promise not to interfere in military matters, make a commitment to continue implementing the program of economic adjustment the caretaker government had agreed upon with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and pledge that no fundamental changes be made in the foreign policy put into place during Zia's period."³⁷ On 2 December 1988 Benazir Bhutto was sworn in as Prime Minister of Pakistan. She was the first female PM of Pakistan. Her appointment was greeted with warmth and expectations both inside and outside Pakistan. Her assumption of office heralded the arrival of democracy after the long dictatorial rule of Zia and was regarded by many observers as the start of a new process of modernization and westernization of Pakistan.³⁸ The western educated Benazir was more acceptable to the West and the USA. However, with no clear ideology and future course of action, Benazir heavily relied on the legacy of her father's rule and time and again reiterated her commitment and respect for democracy and democratic institutions.

In the first few years of her Prime Ministership, Benazir sought the support of the MQM, ANP and BNP. She was more interested in dislodging Nawaz Sharif from the chief ministership of the Punjab. From that time onwards Nawaz Sharif became a sworn enemy of Benazir and missed no opportunity to harass her at every possible occasion. Benazir also succeeded in bringing the country closer to the USA.³⁹

Within a couple of months after becoming the PM, however, she lost the support of her former allies including the MQM (Sindh), ANP (NWFP) and BNP (Balochistan). An important aspect that added to the unpopularity of Benazir was her futile efforts to bring the armed forces under her direct control. The Inter-Intelligence Service (ISI) chief was replaced. This earned the displeasure of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the General Headquarters. Her next step was the retirement of Admiral Iftikhar Sirohoey, the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. Ghulam Ishaq refused to oblige Benazir by arguing that it was at his discretion as the President of Pakistan to appoint or dismiss the Chief of Staff and not at the discretion of the PM to do so. Benazir gave way to the power of the President and did not pursue the matter further. Furthermore, since Benazir was herself in charge of Finance, she created a Board of Investment, and awarded licenses for the establishment of new, large industrial units; she created a cell in the PM's office to oversee loans granted by commercial and development banks operating in the public sector, and formed a

Placement Bureau to provide jobs in the public sector to the PPP workers, particularly to those who suffered during Zia's regime. New programs were initiated and the parliament members were provided huge sums to implement the PM's agenda. Of course, party considerations were given much importance and some legislators were accused of gross embezzlement of the funds provided to them for the welfare of their constituencies.

Benazir's government failed to put a check on corruption. All government policy decisions and contract negotiations, particularly those directly related with the privatization affairs, became suspect, reducing the government's ability to perform its developmental functions. Benazir initially tried to deflect the charges of corruption from her person and from the PPP by arguing that the weak position of the government inside the parliament was keeping it busy in other affairs. To her embarrassment, in 1989 her husband Asif Ali Zardari was implicated in a number of serious allegations of corruption and extortion and became the most notorious figure in the ruling party. "To average Pakistanis," argued Reza Nasr, "all this appeared less than comforting, and it can be said with certainty that the charges of corruption, especially those leveled against Zardari, did much to undermine Benazir and to weaken the Government."⁴⁰ The accusation was leveled against Benazir that the "treatment of public exchequer like hereditary *Jagirs* [feudal landowners] and the plunder of national wealth as booty were so widely reputed that the word 'corruption' became the trade mark of politics in Pakistan."⁴¹

In November 1989, a vote of no-confidence was moved by Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the leader of the Combined Opposition Parties (COP) in the NA. Both sides indulged themselves in spending large amount of sums to keep their supporters in line. "The government had thus become a hostage to elected representatives," commented a political observer, "money became the only measure of political loyalty, and statecraft was reduced to petty squabbles that had no relations to the problems facing the country."⁴² The PPP government narrowly escaped the vote of no-confidence but its aftermath was harmful for Benazir Bhutto. The conflict between the center and the provinces escalated; the Pakistani economy suffered due to the prevailing uncertainty both at center and the provincial level. Finally on 6 August 1990, the period of uncertainty was ended by a presidential order dismissing Benazir Bhutto from office along with her cabinet, and dissolving the National and Provincial Assemblies. The announcement also gave dates for the next general elections: 24 and 27 October 1990 respectively.

Those who had great hopes in Benazir Bhutto's government were disappointed by its performance during her first time as the PM of Pakistan. Benazir's government was unable to restore the 1973 Constitution. Nor did she try to repeal the controversial 8th Amendment introduced by Zia in anticipation of PPP victory at the polls. The PPP-led National

Assembly passed no important legislation during its tenure. Center-provincial relations deteriorated markedly, as evidenced by the widening rift between the PPP and IJI in the Punjab and by the proliferation of ethnic violence in the Sindh. The Afghan crisis also remained unresolved.⁴³

The elections were held according to schedule. The IJI swept the polls at the national level by getting 105 seats in the NA and 252 seats in Provincial Assemblies against 45 seats won by the PDA⁴⁴ in NA and 61 seats in the provincial assemblies. Benazir Bhutto alleged that the caretaker government at the center and in the provinces had indulged in massive rigging to secure the people's verdict in favor of IJI. Nawaz Sharif, the industrialist from Lahore, took oath as the 14th PM of Pakistan and Benazir Bhutto became the Leader of the Opposition in the NA.

The government of Nawaz Sharif soon was confronted with the same issues that had led to the dismissal of Benazir's government. As the IJI was dominated by various right-oriented parties, who had nothing in common except their opposition to the PPP, differences of opinion emerged within various important parties of the IJI. The government was accused of corruption, nepotism, and of incompetence, the repetition of the same charges that led the dismissal of the PPP government. Both the PM and his brother and political advisor Shahbaz Sharif were directly implicated in various corruption cases, which were denied by the former. Meanwhile, on various important issues differences emerged between the President and the PM which eventually led to the dismissal of the Nawaz government. On 18 April 1993 Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed the PM from his office, dissolved the NA and the Provincial Assemblies and announced for another general election in the autumn of the same year under the supervision of an impartial caretaker government.

The October 1993 results gave a clear verdict in favor of Benazir Bhutto. The PPP succeeded in getting 86 seats in the NA, thus becoming the single majority party in the legislature. Benazir Bhutto on 19 October became the PM of Pakistan for the second time, but in a much "stronger" position. This time she was capable of controlling the Punjab, the bastion of power in Pakistan. Moreover, in the presidential elections on 13 November, the PPP nominee Farooq Leghari defeated the PML (N) nominee Waseem Sajjad by 274 to 168 votes.⁴⁵ Benazir started her second tenure as the PM with new hopes and the political pundits observed that now in a much more secure position, she might be the first PM to complete the full term of office. Moreover, on 5 December 1993, Benazir became the "sole spokesman" of the PPP by eliminating her mother Nusrat Bhutto from the co-chairpersonship of the PPP. Nusrat Bhutto was accused of supporting Murtaza Bhutto, the eldest son of Z.A. Bhutto, who after his return from exile had formed a rival group of the PPP called PPP (Shaheed Bhutto). Murtaza was bitterly opposed to the domination of Asif Ali Zardari, Benazir's husband, over his sister and the PPP. Although this faction of the PPP did not enjoy the same

support as was enjoyed by the one led by Benazir Bhutto, it was yet regarded a threat to the authority of Benazir within the PPP.⁴⁶

Benazir's new administration, like many other previous governments, started with rewarding those who had their loyalties with the PPP regime. She replaced the judges with the ones loyal to the PPP. Her next target was the civil servants: those who worked closely with the previous Nawaz government were replaced by those who showed their loyalty to Benazir.

Benazir faced a formidable challenge from her coalition partners in the Punjab and the NWFP. The MQM was already at loggerheads with the PPP regime. Jamaat-i-Islami had its own grievances against the PPP and Benazir was often accused of her "friendship" with India; her westernized ideals and liberal approach towards politics and other affairs in Pakistan. In May 1994, the Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi (TNSM), another religious organization dominant in the Malakand Division and Swat Valley, demanded the introduction of Islamic Law, the *Sharia*, in the Malakand Division. A force of about 40,000 wearing black turbans, armed with sophisticated weapons (easily available since the Afghan crisis), closed roads and disrupted communications there. The government requested the armed forces for help, which they refused on the grounds that the provincial authorities had already deployed the paramilitary troops and the Frontier Constabulary to deal with the situation. The negotiations repeatedly failed.⁴⁷

The political instability gave way to economic deterioration. The economy suffered heavily due to the continued strikes and wheel jams in Karachi. Inflation was rampant and despite the government's devaluation of the Pakistani rupee, which was designed to boost exports, no positive effects were seen. Foreign exchange reserves had fallen. In its annual report the State Bank of Pakistan confirmed the worst situation and its inability to control policy.

Benazir's positive image resurfaced in the wake of her pursuing a successful foreign policy particularly towards the USA. During her tenure as the PM, Pakistan's relations with the U.S. improved as Pakistan gave ample proof of its effectively suppressing the production and export of illegal drugs, particularly the poppy and its product, heroin. Benazir projected Pakistan's image abroad as a moderate Islamic state, open for business and willing to assist the West in its international struggle against drugs and terrorism and even did not hesitate to capture and extradite Razmi Ahmad Yousaf, wanted by the U.S. for his involvement in the Trade Center bombing in New York which took place on 7 February 1995. The successful diplomacy on the part of Benazir government "bore fruit" and on 21 September the American Senate voted in favor of the Brown Amendment.⁴⁸

By mid-1996, following the widespread domestic violence and the dismal performance of the economy, the fall of Benazir's government seemed almost inevitable. Karachi kept "bleeding" mainly because of the violent clashes between the MQM supporters and the law enforcing agencies. Violence spread to other parts of the country. On 22 July a bomb blast at

the Lahore International Airport killed several people. In August, in a village near Multan (the Punjab) a Shia procession was fired upon, killing 18 people. On 20 September the tragic assassination of Murtaza Bhutto, in an "encounter" with the police outside his residence at Karachi, provided the *casus belli* for the dismissal of Benazir's government. Opposition leaders and Murtaza's followers accused the PM and her husband Asif Zardari of being involved in the murder. On 5 November 1996, President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari, a one time staunch supporter of the PPP and Benazir Bhutto nominee for the presidential position, invoked Article 58(B) (2) of the Constitution of Pakistan and dissolved Benazir's government. He also announced a caretaker government and general elections in Pakistan for 3 February 1997.⁴⁹

The electioneering termed by Talbot as the "dullest in Pakistan's history" resulted in some desertions from the PPP particularly in the Punjab. The PPP got only 19 seats in the NA against the "landslide" victory of the PML's 135 seats. In the provincial assembly elections it also showed very a poor performance by getting only 3 seats in the Punjab (PML (N) 211); in the N-WFP 4 (PML (N) 33); in Balochistan 1 (PML (N) 6) and only in Sindh it did fairly well by getting 36 seats as against 15 seats of the PML (N). Benazir accused the government of masterminding the rigging in the elections thus enabling the PML (N) to come to power. But some independent observers confirmed that "the widespread rigging which Benazir Bhutto claimed does not appear to have taken place."⁵⁰

Nawaz Sharif, with his strong electoral support from the important Punjab province, was sworn in as Prime Minister. Benazir became leader of the opposition in the NA. Nawaz instituted a number of cases against Benazir Bhutto and her husband Asif Zardari, who was imprisoned and tried under various charges in different courts of the country. Nawaz Sharif, after his successful meddling in the judiciary, interfered in the armed forces, which resulted in his removal from office on 12 October 1999. After the military coup staged by General Pervez Musharraf, Nawaz Sharif, like Benazir Bhutto was facing charges for corruption, nepotism and treason and Nawaz was convicted by courts for Rigorous Imprisonment as well as disqualified for 21 years from taking part in politics. Benazir Bhutto went into exile intentionally keeping a low profile, waiting for the "return of democracy" to Pakistan, which would enable her to come back and restart her political career in Pakistan, while General Pervez Musharraf, the President of Pakistan, is determined to keep away the "corrupt leaders" from the political scene of Pakistan.

CONCLUSION

The Pakistan People's Party, one of the major political parties in Pakistan, formed in late 1967 and since then came to power three times. Each time, however, its government was dismissed on various charges including

corruption, nepotism, malpractice, and misuse of power. This chapter has analyzed the formation, evolution and PPP's rise to power in the perspective of nation building and democracy.

In domestic politics the single noteworthy achievement of the PPP regime was giving Pakistan the consensus Constitution of 1973. However, Bhutto was criticized for his general attitude towards the public and for his treatment of the basic institutions in the country, which resulted eventually in the downfall of the PPP government. It has been alleged that once Bhutto came to power, he became an autocrat, who cared more for his own authority and control of power both in the party and in the country. The middle class turned against him because of his economic policies. Some objections were raised on his secular ideology. Bhutto's neglect of his own party and his excessive reliance on the security forces, particularly the FSF, earned a bad name for Bhutto and contributed to his downfall. Before coming to power, Bhutto was a staunch supporter of democracy and always advocated in favor of provincial autonomy in a federal system. But once in power he acted against this. By analyzing Bhutto's attitude towards those parties that were demanding provincial autonomy and particularly the treatment meted out to the NAP in Balochistan and the NWFP, one can see his double standards.

Bhutto was dismissed, accused of many charges and finally hanged on murder charges in April 1979. General Zia-ul-Haq, who ruled Pakistan for the next eleven years tried his best to keep the PPP out of national politics. In August 1988 he died in an air crash, leaving field open for the restoration of democracy in the country. The scheduled elections were held giving an opportunity for the PPP to come to power for the second time. Benazir Bhutto, elder daughter of Bhutto, and the co-chairperson of the PPP became the PM of Pakistan but with "limited powers." Benazir followed a policy of appeasement, which only proved to be counter-productive. Her failure in fact had begun from the day when she succumbed to the temptation of power without having adequate support in parliament. Benazir's government was unable to restore the 1973 Constitution, to repeal the controversial Eighth Amendment and to put an end to ethnic violence in Karachi. On the ground of corruption and incompetence Benazir's government was dismissed by President Ishaq Khan.

In the autumn of 1993 another general election was held and Benazir Bhutto was given a second opportunity to rule Pakistan. Once in power for the second time, she annoyed the judiciary by appointing and replacing the judges of her own choice. Those civil servants who remained loyal to the PPP were rewarded in various ways. Public prosecution and courts were used to harass the opposition. The law and order situation virtually went out of government control; even Murtaza Bhutto, the PM's brother was not safe. In a police "encounter" he was assassinated outside his residence in Karachi giving an excuse to the President of Pakistan to dismiss

the PPP government for the third time. Another election was held, wiping out the PPP from many Provincial Assemblies in the NA. Only in Sindh it did fairly well.

Benazir Bhutto was accused of concentrating all powers around herself, which created rifts in the party. In fact, like her father, Benazir was accused of keeping the PPP under her sole control, not ready even to share power with her mother Nusrat Bhutto, the co-chairperson of the PPP. In December 1993 Nusrat was ousted as the co-chairperson of the party, and Benazir Bhutto became the sole chairperson of the PPP. In place of the "old guards," Benazir relied on "yes men," who had no organizational ability or political experiences. Between 1986 and 1988, personal ambitions led Benazir to corner most of the "old guards" of the PPP out of the party, some of them being close associates of Z.A. Bhutto and very able and experienced politicians. Their ouster, eventually, hurt the PPP as it weakened the party's organizational structure and created formidable rivals and enemies. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi was refused a senior post in the PPP, which led to the formation of the National People's Party, a splinter group of the PPP. Benazir Bhutto's reliance on some members of the PPP who supported Zia's Martial Law led Murtaza Bhutto to form his own faction of the PPP called Pakistan People's Party (Shaheed Bhutto), led by Ghinwa Bhutto, the widow of Murtaza.

The PPP which had various diverse groups within its fold and which originally championed the cause of the "down-trodden" masses of Pakistan, was given opportunity to rule the country three times, but failed in bringing any real change to the political society of Pakistan.

NOTES

1. Salmaan Taseer, *Bhutto: A Political Biography* (Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1980), p. 34.

2. *Ibidem.* p. 38. Acknowledging the benevolence conferred upon him by Iskander Mirza, Bhutto wrote to him from Geneva: "For the greater good of my own country, I feel that your services to Pakistan are indispensable. When the history of our country is written by objective historians, your name will be placed even before that of Mr. Jinnah," quoted in Rafi Raza, *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan 1967-1977* (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 2.

3. Rafique Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan 1958-1969* (Islamabad, National Institute of Historical and Cultural, Research, 1987), vol. II, p. 116.

4. Taseer, *opere citato*, pp. 41-42.

5. Stanley Wolpert, *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan His Life and Times* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 59.

6. Wolpert, *opere citato*, p. 71.

7. *Dawn* 4 August 1965 quoted in Taseer, *opere citato*, p. 56.

8. He eulogised Ayub Khan and claimed "He is an Ataturk, for like the great Turkish leader, he has restored the nation's dignity and self-respect in the community of nations. And above all a Salahuddin, like the great Ghazi-ul-Islam,

this heir to the noble heritage has regained a hundred million people's pride and confidence, the highest attribute of life, without which the people are soulless." Taseer, *opere citato*, p. 47. Later on Bhutto's weakest point would be this long association with Ayub's regime, his close affiliation with him and eventually his strong advocacy of Ayub's policies. Instead of trying to defend himself against this public criticism, he frankly admitted his mistakes and even offered to undergo any punishment awarded by the people. See Afzal, *opere citato*, p. 117.

9. Anwar H. Syed, *The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto* (London, Macmillan Press Ltd. 1992), p. 53.

10. Full details can be seen in Altaf Gauhar, *Ayub Khan Pakistan's First Military Ruler*, (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 243-281.

11. Wolpert, *opere citato*, p. 109.

12. These Ten Documents can be summed up as follows: Document 1: Name of the Party; 2: Flag of the Party; 3: Why a New Party? 4: Why Socialism is necessary for Pakistan; 5: Draft Declaration of Principles; 6: The Evolution of the Economy; 7: A Declaration on the Unity of the People; 8: Jammu and Kashmir; 9: The Need for Pakistan to Have Special Relations with Assam; 10: The Six Points Answered. Full details can be seen in V. Grover and R. Arora (eds), *Political System in Pakistan Vol. 3, Political Parties, Elections and Regionalism in Pakistan* (New Delhi, Deep and Deep Publications, 1995), pp. 337-420.

13. Document 4 stated: ". . . Public ownership will not be allowed to degenerate into capitalism. The workers will be encouraged to participate in the efficient running of the factories by appropriate incentives and will by law have the right to a share in the profits of companies in the private sector. Along with nationalisation, steps will be undertaken directly to improve the lot of the wage-earners in the factories, by caring for proper housing, recreation, health of the worker and his family, education of the children, supplementary training for the worker himself to improve his skill and thereby his earning power, and in other ways that may help to raise his cultural level. The objective must be first to integrate the workers in the community in the civic sense and then to proceed to remove the class barriers that keep them and their children remote from the possibilities of leading a better life. Within the factory itself the economic programme of the party fuses with its social." Document 4 quoted in Grover and Arora, *opere citato*, pp. 369-370.

14. According to Taseer Bhutto had a reputation of a good speaker but his was a debating style "better suited to a drawing room or sophisticated forum. He had no real experience of public speaking and mass oratory. Moreover, his voice was high-pitched, his command of Urdu limited and he could not speak Punjabi which was a considerable disadvantage because he was gaining support in the Punjab. . . . but he now set about changing this. Single-mindedly he practised speaking and in a period of months could address meetings in quite creditable Urdu. He abandoned his carefully tailored suits for shirts and the kurta-shalwar, the baggy national dress. On the stump, raw and natural he would cast away conventional elocution, shouting out the plain idiom of ordinary folk. The crowds, infused by the sheer spirit and power of his performance, reacted with spontaneous enthusiasm. As the crescendo of his rhetoric mounted he would stop and take off [f] his coat and roll up his shirtsleeves. The same word was repeated again and again with mesmeric effect. Sometimes he would carefully tear his kurta sleeve so that it would billow and flap as he waved his arms. When the crowd clapped he would clap back. These gestures found increasing

crowd response and became part of his style . . . he mastered another primary political art in being able to present different faces to different people. He directed himself to each one in a very personal way—noble cadence for the idealistically inclined, Rabelaisian and often obscene anecdotes for the earthy types, and always nourishing titbits about rivals. All were beamed to create that special bond upon which lasting relationships are built." Taseer, *opere citato*, p. 84.

15. Mohammad Waseem, *Politics and the State in Pakistan* (Lahore, Progressive Publishers, 1989), p. 303.

16. Raza, *opere citato*, p. 8.

17. Wolpert, *opere citato*, p. 115.

18. For details see Afzal, *opere citato*, pp. 120–141.

19. See also Hafiz Taqiuddin, *Pakistan Ki Siyasi Jamaatey aur Tehrikey* (Lahore, Fiction House, 1995), pp. 460–461.

20. On 20 December, at one of the Party functions in Lahore, Bhutto declared: "Punjab and Sindh are the bastions of power in Pakistan. Majority alone does not count in national politics. No government at the centre could be run without the co-operation of the PPP which controlled these two Provinces . . . I have the key of the Punjab Assembly in one pocket and that of Sindh in the other. . . ." Raza, *opere citato*, p. 44.

21. Bhutto's Address to the Nation on 20 December 1971, Z. A. Bhutto, *President of Pakistan: Speeches and Statements December 20, 1971–March 31, 1972*, (Karachi, The Department of Films and Publications, Government of Pakistan, 1972), pp. 1–16. For more details see *ibid*, April 1, 1972–June 30, 1972; October 1, 1972–December 31, 1972; January 1, 1973–March 31, 1973; and April 1, 1973–August 13, 1973. See also Saeed Shafqat, *Political System of Pakistan and Public Policy* (Lahore, Progressive Publishers, 1989), p. 207.

22. For more details see Waseem, *op.cit*, pp. 310–323; Khalid B. Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change* (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1980), pp. 91–103; and, Shafqat, *opere citato*, pp. 214–218.

23. Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan: The Continuing Search of Nationhood* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1991), p.65.

24. The Pakistan National Alliance included the following parties: (i) Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (ii) National Democratic Party (as the NAP was banned by the Supreme Court of Pakistan it was revived under this new name) (iii) Jamaat-i-Islami (iv) Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (v) Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (vi) Pakistan Muslim League (Pagaro Group) (vii) Pakistan Democratic Party (viii) Khaksar Tehrik (ix) Azad Kashmir Muslim Conference.

25. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947–86* (Lahore, Progressive Publishers, 1987), p. 221.

26. Faiz Ali Chishti, Bhutto, *Zia aur Mey* (Urdu), (Lahore, Jang Publishers, 1997), pp. 57–213.

27. For details see *White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime* (Islamabad, Government of Pakistan, 1979).

28. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, 'If I am Assassinated . . . ' (Delhi, Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, 1979), p. 5.

29. K. M. Arif, *Working With Zia: Pakistan Power Politics 1977–1988* (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 206–210.

30. Taseer, *opere citato*, p. 157.

31. Gul Hasan, *opere citato*, p. 377.
32. On the lack of a true forum for discussion in the PPP, see, among others, Waseem, *opere citato*, pp. 324–325; Anwar H. Syed, *op.cit.* pp. 207–214.
33. Bhutto had appointed Zia-ul-Haq as his Chief of the Army Staff and was promoted to the same rank over the heads of several more senior generals in March 1976. See Chishti, *opere citato*, pp. 82–86.
34. The MRD, a left-oriented political alliance, was dominated by the PPP, set up in February 1981, included the following parties: (i) the PPP (ii) the National Democratic Party (iii) the Pakistan Democratic Party (iv) Tehrik-i-Istiqal (v) Pakistan Muslim League (Khwaja Khairuddin and Malik Qasim Group) (vi) the Qaumi Mahaz-i-Azadi (vii) the Pakistan Mazdoor Kisan Party (viii) Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (ix) Pakistan National Party (xii) the Awami Tehreek (xiii) the NAP (Pashtoonkhwa).
35. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, 'Democracy and the Crisis of Governability in Pakistan,' *Asian Survey*, vol. XXXII, No. 6, June 1992, p. 522.
36. Benazir Bhutto, *Daughter of the East* (London,, Mandarin Paperback, 1989), pp. 376–377.
37. Burki, *opere citato*, p. 99.
38. Benazir Bhutto, *Speeches and Statements 2 December 1988–30 March 1989* (Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1989), pp. 1–9 and also *ibid*, vol. III, *November 30, 1989–May 13, 1990* (1990), pp. 1–4.
39. *ibid*, vol. II, *April 2, 1989–November 14, 1989*, pp. 56–64.
40. Nasr, *opere citato*, p. 531.
41. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan's broadcast to the nation, *Dawn*, 7 August 1990.
42. Nasr, *opere citato*, p. 532.
43. Craig Baxter, Y. K. Malik, C. H. Kennedy, R. C. Oberst (eds.), *Government and Politics in South Asia* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1993), p. 220.
44. An alliance formed by the PPP with Tehrik-i-Istiqal, Muslim League (Chatta Group) and Tehrik-I-Nifaz-li-Fiqh Jafria, of which PPP was the main component and all the PDP seats were won by the PPP candidates.
45. Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History* (London, Hurst and Company, 1998), p. 333.
46. Robert LaPorte, Jr., "Pakistan in 1995 The Continuing Crises," *Asian Survey*, vol. XXXVI, No. 2, February 1999, p. 180.
47. *ibidem*, p. 184.
48. Talbot, *opere citato*, p. 336. For more details see *ibidem*, pp. 333–349.
49. Robert LaPorte Jr., "Pakistan in 1996 Starting Over Again," *Asian Survey*, vol. XXXVII, No. 2, February 1997, p. 120.
50. Talbot, *opere citato*, p. 355.

